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THE NEW FACE OF MISSOURI CHILD SEX CRIMES: 
ELECT OR INSTRUCT 
INTRODUCTION 
“Lloyd G. Oswald was convicted of the detestable and abominable crime 
against nature. He has appealed from a judgment imposing twenty years’ 
imprisonment in accord with the verdict.”1 
These were the opening words of State v. Oswald, an early Missouri 
Supreme Court decision involving multiple acts of statutory sodomy.2 Despite 
recognizing the defendant’s crimes as ones so atrocious they were “not fit to be 
named,” the court nonetheless concluded that the jury’s ability to convict the 
defendant if they believed he committed either of two acts constituting the 
offense of sodomy violated the defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict.3 
Long forgotten until recently, Oswald stands in direct opposition to the last 
several decades of Missouri jurisprudence governing cases involving multiple 
criminal acts. 
Modern child sex crimes are equally as “detestable” and “abominable” as 
they were in the 1950s. As in Oswald, many involve a series of acts committed 
over a lengthy time span.4 In Missouri, the trend towards alleging the 
commission of multiple acts in a multi-count indictment spanning a period of 
weeks, months, or even years has led to increasing judicial deference.5 
Arguably, prosecutors have received the widest possible latitude in drafting 
indictments and informations in these cases. Until recently, most pre-prepared 
verdict directors alleging general time frames have read something to the effect 
of: 
As to Count _____, regarding the defendant _____, if you find and believe 
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: 
That between the dates of _____ and _____, in the County of _____, State of 
Missouri, the defendant [committed the crime of] _____,  
 
 1. State v. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Mo. 1957) (citation omitted) (“We quote § 
563.230: ‘Every person who shall be convicted of the detestable and abominable crime against 
nature, committed with mankind or with beast, with the sexual organs or with the mouth, shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than two years.’”). 
 2. Id. at 563. 
 3. Id. at 562–63. 
 4. See, e.g., State v. Germany, 323 S.W.3d 472, 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (describing 
multiple sex acts between October 2006 and April 2007). 
 5. See infra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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Then you will find the defendant guilty under Count _____ of _____.6 
After a Missouri Supreme Court decision handed down in June 2011, however, 
prosecutors may no longer rely on general allegations of time as set out in the 
Missouri Approved Instructions without taking additional steps to ensure jury 
unanimity as to a particular act.7 
In State v. Celis-Garcia, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned the use of 
general verdict directors in multiple acts cases.8 Although the court’s ruling in 
Celis-Garcia reaches all multiple acts cases before the courts irrespective of 
subject matter, the issue frequently arises in cases involving child sex crimes.9 
Consequently, this Article will focus specifically on cases involving multiple 
sexual acts committed against children. It will argue that Celis-Garcia was 
correctly decided and that the court’s adoption of the “either/or” rule for child 
sex crimes requires a strategic response from Missouri prosecutors in several 
critical respects. Before analyzing the impact of the Celis-Garcia decision, this 
Article will first provide a brief overview of Celis-Garcia, and then provide a 
short history of the legal doctrine and caselaw leading up to the court’s 
decision. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKROUND 
In April 2006, C.J. and K.J., two females ages five and seven, were 
removed from the home of their mother, Maura Celis-Garcia, and placed in 
foster care.10 Upon informing their foster mother that they had been sexually 
abused by their mother and her boyfriend on several occasions, the children 
were interviewed and taken to the hospital for sexual assault forensic 
examinations (“SAFE”).11 Celis-Garcia was subsequently charged with two 
counts of first-degree statutory sodomy—one for each daughter.12 Though 
Celis-Garcia initially was tried in September 2007, the jury was unable to 
reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared.13 Celis-Garcia was retried two 
months later.14 
 
 6. See, e.g., State v. Rudd, 759 S.W.2d 625, 628–29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding like 
instructions as “rescripts of MAI-Cr.3d 320.02.2, adapted to the facts of the case”) (“The words 
‘on or about’ do not put the time at large, but indicate that it is stated with approximate 
certainty.”). 
 7. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 8. State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 158 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
 9. See id. at 155–56 (defining a multiple acts case). 
 10. Id. at 152. 
 11. Id. (“The SAFE reports indicated that C.J. had a segment of her hymen missing, while 
K.J.’s genitals showed no abnormalities.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Celis-Garica, 344 S.W.3d at 152. 
 14. Id. 
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During the second trial, the State presented videotaped depositions of each 
child describing the separate incidents of statutory sodomy.15 K.J.’s deposition 
detailed two occurrences of sodomy on an enclosed back porch and one in her 
mother’s bedroom.16 As to the first incident, K.J. testified that Celis-Garcia and 
her boyfriend touched her breasts, vagina, and buttocks with their hands.17 She 
described the second incident as occurring several days later and claimed 
Celis-Garcia and her boyfriend handcuffed her hands and feet, hung her naked 
from a hook on the bedroom wall, and touched her genitals with their hands.18 
With regard to the third incident, K.J. alleged Celis-Garcia and her boyfriend 
removed both girls from the shower, led them to the enclosed back porch, and 
touched both girls’ private areas with their hands.19 C.J. testified separately to 
the same incident of sexual assault in the bedroom, and a second occurrence of 
sexual touching in a shed behind the home.20 C.J. also claimed to have 
witnessed multiple incidents of sexual abuse committed on her sister.21 
The prosecution presented testimony from two individuals with whom the 
girls had spoken, a forensic interviewer with a children’s advocacy center and 
a licensed social worker. Both accounts revealed additional disclosure from the 
girls involving an incident of sexual touching in the bathroom.22 At the close of 
the evidence, the trial court submitted the following instruction: 
As to Count 1 regarding the defendant Maura L. Celis-Garcia, if you find and 
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First, that between the dates of January 01, 2005 and March 31, 2006, in the 
County of Saline, State of Missouri, the defendant or [her boyfriend] placed 
her or his hands on [C.J.’s] genitals, and 
Second, that such conduct constituted deviate sexual intercourse, and 
Third, that at the time [C.J.] was less than twelve years old, then you are 
instructed that the offense of statutory sodomy in the first degree has 
occurred . . . .23 
The jury found Celis-Garcia guilty of both counts of first-degree statutory 
sodomy, and the trial court sentenced her to two twenty-five year sentences to 
run concurrently with one another.24 
 
 15. Id. at 153. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Celis-Garica, 344 S.W.3d at 153. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 154. 
 24. Id. 
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 Celis-Garcia contended on appeal that the trial court erred in submitting 
verdict directors that failed to “include detailed information about the alleged 
acts of sodomy,” thereby violating “her right to a fair trial, unanimous jury 
verdict, and freedom from double jeopardy.”25 In reviewing for plain error, the 
appellate court concluded the trial judge “might have had an obligation to 
provide more specific instructions if requested by Ms. Celis-Garcia,” but “the 
failure to do so on its own motion under these circumstances was not evident, 
obvious, and clear error.”26 The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer.27 
II. MUTUAL AGREEMENT: THE MISSOURI UNANIMITY REQUIREMENT 
The Sixth Amendment entitles all criminal defendants to a “speedy and 
public trial” by an “impartial jury.”28 In Johnson v. Louisiana, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a guilty verdict from a less-than-unanimous 
jury in federal court does not violate a defendant’s due process rights.29 The 
Missouri Constitution also provides for a jury trial in all criminal litigation30 
but further requires that the verdict be unanimous.31 In State v. Oswald, the 
Missouri Supreme Court reiterated that a defendant is “entitled to the 
concurrence of twelve jurors upon one definite charge of a crime.”32 Finding 
that the statutory sodomy charge given by the trial judge potentially enabled 
some jurors to agree the defendant was guilty of “an offense committed with 
the mouth” while other jurors could reach the same result “with respect to an 
offense committed with the rectum,” the court overturned the defendant’s 
 
 25. State v. Celis-Garcia, No. WD 69199, 2010 WL 1539849, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. April 20, 
2010). 
 26. Id. at *6. The court also stated the following: “Ms. Celis-Garcia concedes that her claim 
of instructional error is not preserved for appellate review because her counsel failed to object to 
the verdict directors at trial. Thus, she seeks review under Rule 30.20 for ‘plain errors affecting 
substantial rights.’” Id. at *2. 
 27. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 154; see also Mo. Const. art. V, § 10 (providing for the 
transfer of cases pending in courts of appeals to the supreme court). 
 28. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 29. 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972); see also Apodoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972) (“We 
are quite sure . . . that the Sixth Amendment itself has never been held to require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in criminal cases. The reasonable doubt standard developed separately from 
both the jury trial and the unanimous verdict.”). 
 30. Mo. Const. art. 1, § 22(a) (“the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain 
inviolate . . . .”). The Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “as heretofore enjoyed” 
as protecting “all the substantial incidents and consequences that pertain to the right to jury trial at 
common law.” State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). The right to a 
unanimous jury verdict is one of the “substantial incidents” protected by Article I, § 22(a). Id. 
 31. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.01(a); see also State v. McGee, 447 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Mo. 1969) 
(en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“We agree that complete waiver of a jury and 
consent to be tried by less than twelve jurors in substance amount to the same thing.”). 
 32. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d at 563. 
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conviction and ordered a new trial.33 Although later courts cited Oswald as 
declaring erroneous disjunctive verdict directors,34 Oswald’s wider 
significance with regard to jury unanimity remained largely unexplored.35 
A. Dormancy of Unanimity Challenges and Minority as a Defense to Specific 
Verdict Directors 
Leading up to Celis-Garcia, defendants in Missouri child sex abuse trials 
significantly failed to challenge before appeal the specificity of the verdict 
directors submitted by the prosecution and authorized by the trial judge.36 
Presumably, this is because courts have long upheld indictments and 
informations containing general allegations of time, such as “between the dates 
of March 15, 1976 and November 16, 1976.”37 In these scenarios, appellate 
courts have commonly cited section 545.030 of the Missouri Revised Statutes 
as explicitly authorizing trial judges to approve general verdict directors.38 The 
current statute provides: “No indictment or information shall be deemed 
invalid . . . [f]or omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed, 
in any case where time is not of the essence of the offense . . . .”39 In child 
sexual abuse cases, courts have determined time is not “of the essence” due to 
the lengthy (or, for violent crimes, nonexistent) statute of limitations.40 In 
Missouri, the statute of limitations for prosecuting “unlawful sexual offenses” 
involving minors is “thirty years after the victim reaches the age of eighteen,” 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., State v. Brigham, 709 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (“The disjunctive 
submission of two distinct acts by which an offense could have been committed has been held to 
be erroneous.”). 
 35. One of the first Missouri cases to explicitly apply Oswald’s unanimity reasoning to a 
case involving multiple acts was State v. Parsons, 339 S.W.3d 543, 553–554 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2011). Interestingly, Oswald cited State v. Jackson, 146 S.W. 1166 (Mo. 1912) and State v. 
Washington, 146 S.W. 1164 (Mo. 1912) to support its interpretation of the unanimity 
requirement—two cases later cited by Celis-Garcia in support of the same assertion. Id. at 551. 
 36. See, e.g., State v. Germany, 323 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (“As Germany 
concedes, his general objection to the instructions was insufficient to preserve for appeal his 
objection to the disjunctive verdict director.”). 
 37. State v. Hoban, 738 S.W.2d 536, 539–40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citing State v. Murray, 
609 S.W.2d 192, 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)). 
 38. See, e.g., Hoban, 738 S.W.2d at 539 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 545.030.1(5) (1986)) 
(“Section 545.030, RSMo 1986, expressly provides that an indictment shall not be deemed 
invalid ‘[f]or omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed, in any case where 
time is not of the essence of the offense.’”). 
 39. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 545.030.1(5) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 40. See, e.g., State v. Sexton, 929 S.W.2d 909, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that time 
was not of the essence in a sodomy case); State v. Mills, 872 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1994) (stating that time is not of the essence in sex offense cases generally). 
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but prosecutions for forcible rape and forcible sodomy may be “commenced at 
any time.”41 
Courts over the last several decades have also based their decisions to 
uphold general verdict directors on the tender age of child victims, explicitly 
recognizing attacks on specificity as commonly raised on appeal, but deeming 
them legally insufficient for reversal.42 Instead, general temporal allegations 
have been “consistently approved” on the basis that child victims “may find it 
difficult to recall precisely the dates of offenses against them months or even 
years after the offense has occurred.”43 As a general policy, courts have strictly 
adhered to the idea that “[l]eeway is necessary in charging sexual abuse and 
sexual intercourse with minors” to prevent defendants from asserting an alibi 
to avoid prosecution “once it becomes apparent that a child was confused with 
respect to the date of a sexual assault.”44 In such cases, courts have concluded 
“[t]he defendant is adequately protected by the requirement that the trier of fact 
must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”45 
Reflecting these principles, the Missouri Approved Instructions explicitly 
authorize the State to set out a “less definite time period” in multiple acts 
cases.46 As an example, Note on Use 5 cites State v. Siems,47 emphasizing as 
correct the appellate court’s decision to uphold an instruction setting out a one 
month time frame.48 Interestingly, the Notes on Use also specify that “upon 
request of the defendant or on the court’s own motion, the place [of offense] 
should be more definitely identified, such as ‘the front bedroom on the second 
floor,’ ‘the southeast corner of the basement,’ etc.”49 While on its face this 
provision may seem to protect the defendant facing a multi-count indictment, it 
deals only with location rather than time, and is therefore relevant only “under 
certain circumstances, such as (a) when evidence of alibi is introduced, or (b) 
when an issue of venue arises, or (c) where the defendant may have committed 
several separate offenses against the same victim at the same general location 
 
 41. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 556.037; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. 556.036.1 (“A prosecution for . . . 
forcible rape, attempted forcible rape, forcible sodomy, attempted forcible sodomy . . . may be 
commenced at any time.”). 
 42. See, e.g., State v. Sprinkle, 122 S.W.3d 652, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he claim that 
an indictment is not specific enough because the dates are too broad is often made in sexual abuse 
cases.”); State v. Weiler, 801 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (“Defendant’s complaint 
against the information often appears in appeals by defendants in cases of sex offenses against 
children, and arguments like defendant’s have been ruled against them time after time.”). 
 43. State v. Carney, 195 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
 44. Hoban, 783 S.W.2d at 541 (citations omitted). 
 45. Id. 
 46. MAI-CR3d 304.02(5)(c) (2009). 
 47. 535 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
 48. MAI-CR3d 304.02(5)(c) (2009). 
 49. MAI-CR3d 304.02(6) (2009). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] THE NEW FACE OF MISSOURI CHILD SEX CRIMES 499 
within a short space of time.”50 As Celis-Garcia later observed, the provision 
standing alone is “insufficient to protect a defendant’s constitutional right to a 
unanimous jury verdict in a multiple acts case.”51 
B. A Split Judicial Climate and the Reawakening of Oswald 
By the close of the twentieth century, many appellate decisions 
aggressively rejected specificity challenges based on either the jury’s capacity 
to differentiate between offenses in multiple acts cases, or on an overarching 
finding of culpability. Courts adopting an expansive view of overall guilt 
advocated that “the jury need only be unanimous as to the ultimate issue of 
guilt or innocence, and need not be unanimous as to the means by which the 
crime was committed.”52 Convictions were upheld by the court so long as the 
instructions submitted to the jury were clearly drafted, and each instruction 
properly defined the essential elements of the defendant’s crime(s).53 In 
contrast, for appellate decisions focusing on the jury’s capacity to differentiate 
between counts, “the relevant inquiry [became] whether . . . the jury clearly 
understood that the defendant was charged with different offenses in distinct 
counts and that each offense was to be considered separately.”54 In making this 
determination, courts considered whether the jury received separate and 
specific verdict directors for each count charged, whether the jury heard 
evidence supporting each count through the trial, and whether a split verdict 
was returned by the jury after deliberation as an indication of individual 
consideration of each count.55 
Around the same time, some courts also began to take notice of the 
potential instructional error created by the issuance of general verdict directors. 
In State v. Parsons, an important case in the line of decisions ultimately giving 
rise to Celis-Garcia, the defendant “concede[d] that Note 4 of the Notes on 
Use for MAI-CR 3d 304.07 gives as an example the very language” he 
contested on appeal, but argued that where “substantive law conflicts with 
 
 50. State v. Johnson, 62 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 51. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 158. 
 52. Germany, 323 S.W.3d at 478 (quoting State v. Fitzpatrick, 193 S.W.3d 280, 292 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2006)) (finding sufficient the “overwhelming” evidence that defendant had sexual 
contact with one or more of his students). 
 53. See Carney, 195 S.W.3d at 570–71 (finding victim’s testimony as to specific acts 
provided “sufficient evidence” of guilt); Sexton, 929 S.W.2d at 916–17 (finding record was 
“replete with evidence” to support counts). 
 54. State v. Williams, 329 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 55. Id.; see also State v. Marley, 257 S.W.3d 198, 201 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“The jury 
acquitted Marley of all other charges involving genital and body part contact . . . . Given the 
context of the instructions and the explanation in argument, we are not persuaded that the jury 
was granted a roving commission that resulted in manifest injustice.”). 
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MAI-CR 3d and its Notes on Use, the substantive law controls . . . .”56 
Rejecting this argument, the court found that “[i]mplicit in the use of approved 
pattern instructions like MAI-CR is the notion that they should be simple, 
brief, and submit ultimate issues rather than detailed evidentiary facts.”57 
Nonetheless, the court proceeded to analyze Parsons’ unanimity challenge 
under past precedent. 
Significantly, the court returned to the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision 
in State v. Oswald in reviewing the defendant’s challenge to the trial court 
instructions for plain error.58 Reaffirming as erroneous the use of disjunctive 
verdict directors,59 the court noted that prior courts had distinguished the facts 
before them from Oswald by creating the caveat that “while it [is] error to 
make a disjunctive submission on the ‘gravamen of the offense’ . . . it [is] not 
error to submit alternative means of the committing the offense [sic] . . . .”60 
When applying this precedent to Parsons’ case, however, the court determined 
that Parsons had attempted to rape the victim on “at least two separate 
occasions—once in the bedroom and once in the bathroom.”61 These attempts, 
the court concluded, were “not simply a continuous series of steps toward 
committing a single rape” but were rather “repeated anew.”62 Based on this 
analysis, the court found “the trial court erred by submitting Instruction No. 9 
because it failed to identify which of these separate incidents the jury was 
being asked to unanimously find constituted ‘tr[ying] to have sexual 
intercourse with [Victim].’”63 
Despite this finding of error, the court observed that Parsons failed to cite a 
Missouri case addressing the unanimity issue and instead analogized 
distinguishable cases involving disjunctive submissions.64 For this reason, the 
court concluded there had been no “evident, obvious and clear” error resulting 
in “manifest injustice” or “miscarriage of justice.”65 Although the court in 
Parsons declined to create new precedent and failed to find that the submission 
of a general verdict director in a multiple acts case constitutes plain error, the 
court’s decision is nonetheless significant because it acknowledged the flawed 
nature of the verdict director itself. This decision ultimately laid the 
 
 56. Parsons, 339 S.W.3d 543 at 550 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 57. Id. (quoting State v. Wood, 668 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)). 
 58. Id. at 551. In addition to relying on Oswald, the defendant had also cited State v. 
Washington, 141 S.W. 1164 (Mo. 1912) and State v. Jackson, 146 S.W. 1166 (Mo. 1912), both of 
which were relied on by the Missouri Supreme Court in Celis-Garcia. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Parsons, 339 S.W3d at 551–52. 
 61. Id. at 552. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 553. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Parsons, 339 S.W.3d at 553. 
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groundwork for the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision two months later in 
Celis-Garcia.66 
III.  UNANIMTIY REDEFINED: THE CELIS-GARCIA DECISION 
In State v. Celis-Garcia, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a 
defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict must be protected in multiple acts 
cases by the state either: (1) “electing the particular criminal act on which it 
will rely to support the charge,” or (2) “specifically describing the separate 
criminal acts” in the verdict director and instructing the jury “that it must agree 
unanimously that at least one of those acts occurred.”67 The court began its 
analysis by reaffirming a defendant’s right under the Missouri Constitution to a 
unanimous jury verdict.68 In considering whether Celis-Garcia had been 
deprived of this right, the court first sought to determine whether the facts 
under review properly constituted a case involving “multiple acts.”69 The court 
defined multiple acts as arising “when there is evidence of multiple, distinct 
criminal acts,” and set out the following four-part factors analysis to guide 
judicial inquiry: 
(1) whether the acts occur at or near the same time; (2) whether the acts occur 
at the same location; (3) whether there is a causal relationship between the 
acts, in particular whether there was an intervening event; and (4) whether 
there is a fresh impulse motivating some of the conduct.70 
Applying this test to the facts before them, the court observed “there were 
at least seven acts of statutory sodomy that occurred at different times (some 
more than three days apart) and in different locations.”71 The trial testimony 
consisted of numerous incidents occurring in multiple locations including an 
enclosed back porch, the defendant’s bedroom, the children’s bathroom, and a 
shed behind the home.72 “Despite evidence of multiple, separate incidents of 
statutory sodomy,” the court observed that “the verdict directors failed to 
differentiate between the various acts in a way that ensured the jury 
unanimously convicted Ms. Celis-Garcia of the same act or acts.”73 
In analyzing the verdict director administered by the trial judge, the court 
made several observations. First, the broad allegation of time enabled “each 
individual juror to determine which incident he or she would consider in 
 
 66. Parsons was decided on April 11, 2011. Parsons, 339 S.W.3d at 543. Celis-Garcia was 
decided on June 14, 2011. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 150. 
 67. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 157. 
 68. Id. at 155. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 155–156 (quoting 75b Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1511 (2007). 
 71. Id. at 156. 
 72. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 156. 
 73. Id. 
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finding Ms. Celis-Garcia guilty of statutory sodomy.”74 As phrased, “jurors 
could convict Ms. Celis-Garcia if they found that she engaged or assisted in 
hand-to-genital contact with the children during an incident in her bedroom, or 
on the enclosed porch, or in the shed, or in the bathroom.”75 Second, “the 
verdict directors submitted by the state instructed the jurors to find Ms. Celis-
Garcia guilty if they believed she committed sodomy by hand-to-genital 
contact generally.”76 Because “[t]he state presented evidence of multiple, 
separate instances of hand-to-genital contact committed against both victims, 
any one of which would have supported the charged offenses . . . the verdict 
directors were erroneous.”77 In light of these observations, the court found it 
was “impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously agreed on any one 
of these separate incidents,” and “the verdict directors violated Ms. Celis-
Garcia’s constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict.”78 
Having found the verdict director constitutionally inadequate, the court 
turned next to the constitutionality of the Missouri Approved Instructions 
generally, which “do not require differentiation among multiple, separate 
criminal acts that each could constitute the charged offense, unless the 
defendant requests or the court elects to do so on its own motion.”79 The court 
found this permitted modification was “insufficient to protect a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict in a multiple acts case” because 
it is “written in permissive rather than mandatory language.”80 Furthermore, 
the Note on Use provides for additional identifying detail only with regard to 
location, failing to consider timing, or “other distinguishing characteristics.”81 
“Most significantly,” the court observed, “the note does not require that the 
jury unanimously agree on the same criminal act that serves as the basis for the 
defendant’s conviction.”82 Given these observations, the court concluded the 
constitutional mandate will only be met if a verdict director “describe[s] the 
separate criminal acts with specificity,” and the court “instruct[s] the jury to 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 158. 
 77. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 158. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 157-158 (citing MAI-CR 3d 304.02 Note on Use 6) (“The place of the offense may 
become of decisive importance under certain circumstances such as . . . (c) where the defendant 
may have committed several separate offenses against the victim at the same general location 
within a short space of time. In such a situation, upon the request of the defendant or on the 
court’s own motion, the place should be more definitely identified, such as ‘the front bedroom on 
the second floor,’ ‘the southeast corner of the basement,’ etc.”). 
 80. Id. at 158. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 158. 
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agree unanimously on at least one of the specific criminal acts 
described . . . .”83 
The court also returned to its prior opinions in State v. Washington84 and 
State v. Jackson,85 two companion cases unrelated to sexual offenses upon 
which it had relied in Oswald to conclude the defendant’s right to a unanimous 
jury verdict had been violated. The court observed both cases involved single 
counts of charged criminal gambling activity, but each verdict director failed to 
specify which gambling table served as the basis for prosecution.86 This 
enabled the jury “to convict the defendant even though some of the jurors may 
have agreed to a verdict of guilty as to one table and disbelieved the testimony 
as to the other table, while the other jurors may have found the opposite to be 
true.”87 The court also reiterated its prior statement in Jackson that to “avoid 
violating a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict in a multiple acts 
case, the state should be required to ‘elect’ the specific act on which it asks the 
jury to convict.”88 In recognizing this principal as valid, the court noted “other 
states have guaranteed a unanimous verdict by allowing the prosecution either 
to elect the particular criminal act on which it will rely to support the charge or 
to require the trial court to specifically instruct the jury that it must agree on 
the same underlying criminal act.”89 Based on this analysis, the court 
concluded a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict is protected only 
through election of a particular criminal act, or submission of a specific 
unanimity instruction to the jury.90 
“Having determined the trial court erred by failing to correctly instruct the 
jury,” the court sought to determine “whether that error resulted in manifest 
injustice or a miscarriage of justice, thereby warranting reversal.”91 The court 
noted that the defendant “relied on evidentiary inconsistencies and factual 
improbabilities respecting each specific allegation of hand-to-genital contact” 
and distinguished Celis-Garcia’s case from “some statutory sodomy cases in 
which the defense simply argues that the victims fabricated their stories.”92 
Based on these observations, the court found it “more likely that individual 
jurors convicted her on the basis of different acts,” and “the verdict directors 
misdirected the jury in a way that affected the verdict, thereby resulting in 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. 146 S.W. 1164 (Mo. 1912). 
 85. 146 S.W. 1166 (Mo. 1912). 
 86. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W. 3d at 156. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 157 (citing Jackson, 146 S.W. at 1168). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 158. 
 91. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 158. 
 92. Id. at 158–59 (also acknowledging that “the jury was free to believe or disbelieve any of 
the witness testimony”). 
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manifest injustice.”93 Consequently, the court reversed Ms. Celis-Garcia’s 
convictions for first-degree statutory sodomy.”94 
IV. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS: EVIDENT AND NOT-SO-OBVIOUS ERROR 
Quite significantly, Celis-Garcia created groundbreaking constitutional 
precedent in the face of “plain error” review. “Whether briefed or not, plain 
errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the 
court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has 
resulted therefrom.”95 Plain error review under Rule 30.20 is therefore a two-
step process in which the court first seeks to determine whether an obvious, 
clear error occurred, and then seeks to determine if a miscarriage of justice will 
result if the error is left uncorrected.96 In criminal jury trials, “reversal is proper 
only if an evidentiary error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of 
a fair trial.”97 Missouri courts have made clear that a mistrial is a “drastic 
remedy” to be resorted to “only in the most extraordinary of circumstances” 
and when “the prejudicial effect of improper evidence or argument can be 
removed in no other way.”98 
In State v. Germany, a case decided eight months prior to Celis-Garcia, the 
Missouri Court of Appeals concluded the trial court’s submission of jury 
instructions with disjunctive verdict directors alleged in multiple counts did not 
constitute plain error in light of the defendant’s “overwhelming” guilt.99 
“Because his guilt was clear,” the court observed, “the effect of the disjunctive 
verdict director on the jury’s verdict, if any, did not result in manifest 
injustice.”100 The court concluded, “a jury need only be unanimous as to the 
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence, and need not be unanimous as to the 
means by which the crime was committed.”101 Less than a year later, the 
Missouri Supreme Court made a drastic turnaround. 
In Celis-Garcia, the court applied “clear error” analysis to conclude a 
miscarriage of justice had in fact occurred, and the defendant had been 
deprived of her right to a fair trial. This legal conclusion necessitates 
consideration as to why, if the error was so “clear” and “obvious,” appellate 
courts failed to discern the constitutional inadequacy of the Missouri Approved 
 
 93. Id. at 159. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 30.20. 
 96. 22 Mo. Prac., Missouri Evidence § 103.3 (3d ed. 2011). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding plain error is that which seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings). 
 99. 323 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 100. Id. (citing State v. Haynes, 158 S.W.3d 918, 919–20 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)) 
 101. Id. at 478. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Instruction for numerous decades. This author believes Celis-Garcia was 
correctly decided by the Missouri Supreme Court, and multi-count indictments 
alleging general time frames were not subject to judicial scrutiny for several 
reasons. First, as one appellate court observed in the 1990s, the Oswald case 
was decided in 1957,102 and the Missouri Supreme Court did not approve the 
first MAI criminal jury instructions until 1973.103 Presumably, Missouri courts 
of appeals declined to invalidate general verdict directors under the assumption 
that the Missouri Supreme Court itself would amend any approved instructions 
that failed to adequately protect a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury 
verdict. In the limited circumstances under which error was found by the court, 
such error was therefore determined not to be a miscarriage of justice 
warranting reversal. In addition, appellate courts seemingly forged an artificial 
distinction between the effect of duplicitous and multiplicitous indictments, 
further limiting Oswald’s ruling in an attempt to protect child victims. For 
these reasons, courts did not require additional measures to protect a 
defendant’s unanimity and due process rights in multiple acts cases. 
A. Duplicity Distinguished 
As previously described in Celis-Garcia, multiple acts cases arise when 
there is evidence of “multiple, distinct criminal acts.”104 Multiple acts cases 
commonly involve acts remote in time and location that are motivated by fresh 
impulse.105 When a multiple acts case exists, there are several steps a 
prosecutor must take in protecting against or responding to a unanimity 
challenge. First, the statutory language must be examined “to determine 
whether the legislature created multiple, separate offenses, or a single offense 
with alternative manners or means of commission.”106 Because sexual crimes 
like statutory sodomy may be found by a jury to have been committed by any 
 
 102. It warrants remembering that when Oswald was decided, the word “sodomy” alone was 
“sufficient to constitute a general verdict of guilty in prosecutions under § 563.230,” without 
differentiation as to the means by which the crime was committed. See Oswald, 306 S.W.2d at 
563. 
 103. State v. Wilkins, 872 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). But cf. State v. Pope, 733 
S.W.2d 811, 813 (Mo. Ct. App 1987) (holding pattern instruction for deviate sexual intercourse 
that failed to specify deviate act with which defendant was charged allowed jurors to convict 
based on testimony as to other uncharged acts, entitling defendant to a new trial) (“Modifications 
of approved instructions are often called for by the facts of the case, Rule 28.02(d), and their use 
is always subject to their being ‘applicable under the law to the facts’, Rule 28.02(c). The obvious 
truth is stated in ‘How to Use This Book’ (1988 revision), MAI-CR2d at xviii: “Most of the 
instructions were prepared upon various assumptions. If any one or more of those assumptions is 
not valid for a particular case the MAI-CR instruction may need adaption to the situation 
presented.”) 
 104. 344 S.W.3d at 155–56 (quoting 75b Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1511 (2007)). 
 105. 75b Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1511 (2007). 
 106. Id. 
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one of several defined criminal actions by the defendant, they constitute 
“single offense[s] with alternative manners or means of commission.”107 
Verdict directors presenting such alternative means of commission in the 
disjunctive create the problem of “duplicity,” defined as “the joining in a single 
count of two or more distinct and separate offenses.”108 
“One vice of duplicity is that a general guilty verdict against a defendant 
on that count does not reveal whether the jury found him guilty of one crime 
or . . . of [all potential crimes covered by the count].”109 “Conceivably, this 
could prejudice the defendant in protecting himself against double jeopardy[,]” 
because “numerous acts of criminal conduct falling within a duplicitous count, 
together with generalized allegations of proof may” fail to “prevent a second 
prosecution from being brought against a defendant.”110 
“Another vice of duplicity is that because the jury has multiple offenses to 
consider under a single count, the jury may convict without reaching a 
unanimous agreement on the same act, thereby implicating a defendant’s right 
to jury unanimity.”111 This was the Missouri Supreme Court’s rationale in 
State v. Oswald. Because Oswald involved two offenses, either of which could 
have constituted the single count of statutory sodomy charged in the 
indictment, later courts mistakenly limited Oswald’s unanimity holding as 
specific to disjunctive, either-or verdict directors.112 A proper reading of 
Oswald, however, reveals that the critical issue in all cases is whether there 
was “a concurrence of twelve jurors upon one definite charge of a crime,” 
regardless of whether the defendant’s criminal acts are splintered into separate 
counts or subsumed within a single count charged in the indictment.113 
Confusingly, many child sexual abuse cases involve multiple counts of 
statutory sodomy, and statutory sodomy is a crime capable of commission by 
alternative means.114 Therefore, it is critical that the State determine in 
advance of trial whether multiple offenses will be contemplated within a single 
count or within multiple counts. As modern scholars recognize: 
 
 107. Id.; see also Oswald, 306 S.W.2d at 563 (finding the charged count of statutory sodomy 
could have been found by the jury to have been committed by means of the mouth or the rectum). 
 108. Thomas Lundy, Jury Instruction Corner: Duplicity—Part Two: A Methodology for 
Determining When Specific Juror Unanimity Is Required, 34 Champion, Dec. 2010, at 49, 49 
(emphasis added). 
 109. State v. Muhm, 775 N.W.2d 508, 515 (S.D. 2009) (quoting United States v. Starks, 515 
F.2d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 1975)). 
 110. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111. Id. at 517 (citing United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 112. See, e.g., State v.Brigham, 709 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 113. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 114. See, e.g., State v. Hyman, 37 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Wyatt, 811 
S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. Ct. App.1991). 
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The unanimity of a verdict is jeopardized in multiple-count trials if more 
incidents of the offenses are presented than the number charged, and the jury 
receives no guidance from the trial court or indication from the State as to 
which offenses are to be considered for which verdict sheets. Also, charging in 
the disjunctive on separate offenses involving separate incidents runs afoul of 
the unanimity requirement for a jury verdict . . . .115 
Therefore, when only a single count is charged, Oswald makes clear that the 
State may not submit a disjunctive verdict director.116 When multiple acts are 
presented to the jury in conjunction with a verdict director alleging multiple 
counts, specific election or instruction is required. 
Unlike Oswald, cases like Celis-Garcia and its predecessors involving 
multi-count indictments charged within a general time frame create the danger 
of “multiplicity,” defined as the splintering of a single offense into separate 
counts of an indictment.”117 Therefore, “in . . .cases involving multiple acts, 
either an instruction must be given stating that the jurors must unanimously 
find the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, or the state must make an election as to the particular act upon which it 
will rely for conviction.”118 Defendants view the election requirement 
favorably because it enables focused defense preparation, protects the 
defendant against double jeopardy, and facilitates appellate review of the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence presented.119 In many states, a defendant’s failure 
to request an election by the prosecution necessitates a unanimity instruction 
given by the trial judge to the jury.120 
Missouri cases were slow to recognize the danger of multiplicity due to the 
artificial distinction forged by appellate courts between the effect of 
duplicitous and multiplicitous indictments. The appellate court in Celis-Garcia 
distinguished their decision from Oswald by reasoning that the specific act of 
sodomy was not presented in the disjunctive, and therefore Ms. Celis-Garcia 
“could not have been found guilty of first-degree statutory sodomy unless all 
of the jurors agreed” she was guilty of the count charged.121 In creating this 
distinction, the court limited Oswald’s unanimity requirement to protect only 
against the threat of duplicity. Although the indictment in Oswald was 
duplicitous rather than multiplicitous, Oswald ultimately stood for the 
proposition that each member of the jury must agree to the same set of facts 
constituting the crime charged in rendering a guilty verdict.122 Despite Celis-
 
 115. 75b Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1511 (2007). 
 116. State v. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 559, 563 (Mo. 1957). 
 117. State v. Muhm, 775 N.W.2d 508, 514 (S.D. 2009). 
 118. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1647 (2011). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. State v. Celis-Garcia, No. WD 69199, 2010 WL 1539849, at *4 (April 20, 2010). 
 122. See State v. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 559, 563 (Mo. 1957). 
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Garcia’s contention that the verdict directors lacked specificity as to the date 
and location of the offenses charged, the court turned a blind eye to 
multiplicity dangers in narrowly interpreting the MAI. 
In determining that time is not of the essence in child sex crimes,123 courts 
seemingly lost sight of the requirement that the particular acts alleged in an 
indictment must nonetheless be distinguished from one another and proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. To rectify this error, the Missouri Supreme Court 
in Celis-Garcia drew from a developing body of caselaw in other states 
regarding a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict in multiple acts 
cases.124 
B. Elect or Instruct: Evolving National Precedent 
As explained by the South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Muhm, the 
most commonly followed procedure for balancing the need to prosecute cases 
involving repetitive acts charged in a single count against a defendant’s due 
process and jury unanimity rights has been described as the “either/or rule.”125 
This rule is derived predominantly from California caselaw. In People v. 
Jones, the California Supreme Court observed that several decisions of its 
lower court had developed an either/or rule applicable when the number of 
specific acts introduced at trial exceeded the number of acts pleaded in the 
information: “Either the prosecutor must select the acts relied on to prove the 
charges, or the jury must be given an instruction that it must unanimously 
agree beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the same 
specific criminal act.”126 Interestingly, the South Dakota Supreme Court 
additionally concluded that: 
when there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular 
acts, and the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed 
all of them, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, 
in addition to allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific 
acts, also allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant 
committed all the acts described by the victim.127 
The court reasoned that because credibility is usually the “true issue,” the jury 
will either “believe the child’s testimony that the consistent, repetitive pattern 
of acts occurred or disbelieve it.”128 
 
 123. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 124. See State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
 125. 775 N.W.2d 508, 518 (S.D. 2009). 
 126. 792 P.2d 643, 649 (Cal. 1990) (en banc). 
 127. Muhm, 775 N.W.2d at 519 (citations omitted). 
 128. Id. at 520 (quoting Jones, 792 P.2d at 659) (“In either event, a defendant will have his 
unanimous jury verdict and the prosecution will have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
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In an opinion somewhat in conflict with Missouri caselaw, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio recognized that while the prosecution must either “elect” or 
“instruct” in multiple acts cases, the same is not applicable to alternative means 
cases: 
In an alternative means case, where a single offense may be committed in more 
than one way, there must be jury unanimity as to guilt for the single crime 
charged. Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by which the 
crime was committed so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative 
means. In reviewing an alternative means case, the court must determine 
whether a rational trier of fact could have found each means of committing the 
crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.129 
Several states have adopted verdict directors for use in both single and 
multi-count, multiple acts cases. The pattern Kansas instruction for single 
count, multiple act cases specifies that for the defendant to be found guilty of 
the crime charged, the jury “must unanimously agree on the same underlying 
act.”130 In multiple count cases, the jury is instructed that “each crime 
charged . . . is a separate and distinct offense,” and each charge must be 
decided separately on the evidence and law applicable to it, uninfluenced by 
the jury’s decision as to any other charge.131 
The state of California, on the other hand, adopted a multiple acts 
instruction specific to child sexual abuse cases.132 The verdict director specifies 
the counts in which the defendant is accused of having committed the 
particular crime, and also the general time frame in which the acts were alleged 
to have occurred. In its entirety, the verdict director reads: 
Defendant is accused [in Count[s]______] of having committed the crime of 
______, a violation of section ______ of the Penal Code, on or about a period 
of time between ______ and ______. 
In order to find the defendant guilty, it is necessary for the prosecution to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of [a specific act [or acts] 
constituting that crime] [all of the acts described by the alleged victim] within 
the period alleged. 
 
defendant committed a specific act, for if the jury believes the defendant committed all the acts it 
necessarily believes he committed each specific act.”). 
 129. State v. Gardner, 889 N.E.2d 995, 1005 (Ohio 2008); c.f. State v.Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 
559, 563 (Mo. 1957) (“It cannot be determined that there was a concurrence of twelve jurors upon 
one definite charge of a crime.”). 
 130. PIK-CR3d. 68.09-B (2009). 
 131. PIK-CR3d. 68.07 (2009). 
 132. See CALJIC 17.01 (2011) (“In child molesting cases, when it is alleged defendant 
committed two or more crimes between certain dates, use CALJIC 4.71.5.”). 
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And, in order to find the defendant guilty, you must unanimously agree upon 
the commission of [the same specific act [or acts] constituting the crime] [all 
of the acts described by the alleged victim] within the period alleged. 
It is not necessary that the particular act or acts committed so agreed upon be 
stated in the verdict.133 
The Use Note specifies this instruction is to be used “where the information 
charges an act or series of acts within a specified period and the prosecution 
has not elected to rely upon any specific date or dates, and the alleged criminal 
activity does not come within the continuous course of conduct exception.”134 
Washington adopted a specific election instruction to be used “for a case in 
which the jury heard evidence of multiple acts but the prosecutor has elected to 
specify one act as constituting the criminal conduct.”135 This instruction 
informs the jury that the State, in alleging a particular crime, has relied upon 
evidence regarding a single act constituting the offense which must be proved 
and agreed to by the jury unanimously.136 When no such election is made, the 
prosecution is instructed to use WPIC 4.25, which informs the jury they must 
unanimously agree to one of multiple acts constituting the offense.137 
C. Missouri and Prosecutorial “Elect or Instruct” Strategy 
The “elect or instruct rule” is undoubtedly the new face of child sex crimes 
for Missouri prosecutors. In 2010 alone, 270 of the 292 victims of registered 
Missouri sex offenders were under the age of eighteen.138 Of those child 
victims, forty were male and 230 were female.139 National statistics show that 
sixty-seven percent of sexual assaults involve victims under eighteen, and 
approximately two-thirds of these sexual assaults are committed by someone 
known to the victim.140 Based on the overwhelming number of child victims 
and the common familiarity these victims share with their perpetrators, 
prosecutors will be continually forced to rely on multi-count indictments 
alleged over a general time frame. 
Nonetheless, no new instruction has been adopted by the Missouri 
Supreme Court since Celis-Garcia was decided. Presumably, trial judges have 
 
 133. CALJIC 4.71.5 (2011). 
 134. Id. 
 135. 11 WPIC 4.26 (3d ed. 2008). 
 136. Id. 
 137. 11 WPIC 4.25 (3d ed. 2008). 
 138. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, Missouri Sex Offender Registry: Summary of 
Victim Demographics Gender by Age Group, Offense Year 2010, 
http://www.mshp.dps.mo.gov/CJ38/statistics.jsp (last visited May 20, 2012). 
 139. Id. 
 140. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, Sex Offender Registry Fact Sheet, 
http://www.mshp.dps.mo.gov/MSHPWeb/PatrolDivisions/CRID/SOR/factsheet.html (last visited 
May 20, 2012) (citing U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Statistics 2007). 
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proceeded by issuing a unanimity instruction in conjunction with the verdict 
directors when the prosecution fails to elect a specific transaction or 
occurrence to constitute each offense charged in a criminal indictment. As 
suggested by the Missouri Practice Handbook, motions for bills of particulars 
may also be appropriate in some cases.141 Citing to Celis-Garcia, the Criminal 
Practice Handbook suggests that “some judges will insist that a bill of 
particulars be filed which fixes the time of the occurrence or occurrences with 
respect to certain events, such as the child’s birthday or a major holiday, so 
that the defendant has a reasonable idea as to the time frame in which the 
illegal conduct allegedly occurred.”142 In adding detail to verdict directors, 
however, prosecutors must avoid impermissibly commenting on the evidence 
adduced at trial. In State v. Eaker, a Washington court of appeals concluded a 
verdict director detailing the time of the offense as “while [the victim’s] 
parents were on vacation on the day that [defendant] was babysitting [the 
victim] and took him to his house” improperly assumed as undisputed the facts 
it alleged.143 
Practically speaking, Celis-Garcia makes clear that for prosecutors, the 
new face of child sex crimes is the “elect or instruct” rule. At first glance, 
instruction seems preferable to election because it affords the jury a great deal 
of latitude in finding the defendant guilty. Jurors need not specify the particular 
occurrence upon which their guilty verdict is based, and need only agree 
unanimously on a particular act for each count after considering all of the 
evidence introduced by the prosecution. While Celis-Garcia essentially 
overruled the reasoning of the Missouri Court of Appeals in State v. Germany, 
which focused on an overarching belief in the defendant’s guilt, 144 that same 
rationale generally underlies prosecutorial preference for instruction over 
election. As the South Dakota Supreme Court correctly observed, credibility is 
usually the “true issue” in child sex crimes, and the jury will either “believe the 
child’s testimony that the consistent, repetitive pattern of acts occurred or 
disbelieve it.”145 In those cases, “the only question is whether the defendant in 
 
 141. 28 Mo. Cr. Prac. Handbook § 7:3 (2012); see also State v. Mills, 872 S.W.2d 875, 878 
(Mo. App. Ct. 1994) (“Under Rule 23.04 a trial court has discretion to direct or permit the filing 
of a bill of particulars. Denial of a motion for a bill of particulars will not be disturbed unless an 
abuse of discretion is shown. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling for abuse in this regard we know 
that ‘[t]he function of such a bill is limited to that of informing the defendant of the particulars of 
the offense sufficiently to prepare his defense.’” (citations omitted)). 
 142. 28 Mo. Cr. Prac. Handbook § 7:3 (2012). The practice guide additionally notes that the 
State often responds to a motion for a bill of particulars by arguing that discover will provide the 
answers required by the defendant, but this argument is improper “since the burden is not on the 
defendant to provide information sufficient to prepare a defense.” Id. 
 143. 53 P.3d 37, 41–42 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 144. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 145. State v. Muhm, 775 N.W.2d 508, 520 (S.D. 2009). 
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fact committed all of [the acts.]”146 Although jurors in multiple acts cases often 
believe or disbelieve the entirety of a child’s allegations, this will not always 
be the case. 
In many circumstances, it will be more favorable for the prosecution to 
rely solely on one underlying act for each count charged in order to ensure a 
guilty verdict. In issuing a unanimity instruction in cases involving young 
children who may be confused as to particular dates and occurrences, the 
prosecution risks that the jury will fail to reach unanimous agreement as to a 
particular count. By electing a single act for which the prosecution is able to 
produce the most convincing evidence, the prosecution is more likely to 
receive a favorable verdict. 
D. A Breakdown of Prosecutorial Either/or Strategy 
As previously established, the danger of multiplicity arises in a multiple 
acts case when the number of acts alleged exceeds the number of counts 
charged.147 If the number of acts alleged in trial matches the number of counts 
charged against the defendant in the indictment, the only potential threat to a 
defendant’s unanimity rights arises from the danger of duplicity. Duplicity is 
created only when the defendant is charged with an offense capable of 
commission by alternative means, such as statutory sodomy, and only when 
those means are presented within the indictment in the disjunctive.148 So long 
as prosecutors are careful not to enable the jury to convict the defendant if they 
believe any of several acts constituting the offense occurred, prosecutorial 
either/or strategy will only come into play when the number of acts alleged at 
trial exceeds the number of counts charged in the indictment. Prosecutorial 
either/or strategy can arguably be broken down into three main steps, each of 
which is associated with a distinct trial phase. 
Step One—Indictment Phase: The first step in prosecutorial either/or 
strategy begins in the indictment phase. If a defendant is alleged to have 
committed multiple offenses, the prosecution must carefully consider the 
number of counts with which the defendant will be charged for each offense. 
In criminal cases where the defendant is accused of child molestation or sexual 
assault, the Federal Rules of Evidence permit a trial court to admit evidence 
that the defendant committed any other child molestation or sexual assault.149 
In contrast, evidence of a defendant’s prior acts of sexual misconduct is 
inadmissible under Missouri law as improper character evidence.150 Even when 
 
 146. Id. at 519. 
 147. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text. 
 149. Fed. R. Evid. 413–14. 
 150. In State v. Ellison, the Missouri Supreme Court struck down Missouri Statute 566.025, 
which made evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual misconduct admissible in sex cases, as 
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the prosecution intends to ultimately elect a single occurrence or transaction to 
constitute a charged offense, prosecutors should initially charge every possible 
count of sexual misconduct in order to introduce a full range of evidence 
against the defendant at trial. Failure to charge all relevant acts could result in 
the inadmissibility of the defendant’s prior alleged acts involving the victim in 
some courts. 
Step Two—Amendment Phase: Although many prosecutors are 
undoubtedly tempted to submit the maximum possible counts against a 
defendant to the jury for deliberation, judges rarely stack sentences 
consecutively. More often than not, a defendant’s sentence for each count runs 
concurrently with the additional sentences,151 mitigating the benefit of 
charging multiple counts in a criminal indictment. Because jurors in multiple 
acts cases must now be completely unanimous as to which of the alleged acts 
they will rely upon in convicting the defendant for each count,152 prosecutors 
should consider amending the indictment to a single count for each offense 
charged based on the overall presentation of evidence at trial. In doing so, the 
prosecution arguably removes a great deal of potential confusion, 
disagreement, or even deadlock from jury deliberation.153 
Step Three—Instruction Phase: Finally, after amending the criminal 
indictment (and regardless of the number of counts charged for each offense), a 
special instruction explaining the prosecution’s election of a single act or 
submission of a special unanimity instruction should be submitted to the jury. 
If the prosecution chooses to issue a special unanimity instruction, the jury 
may permissibly consider all of the acts introduced at trial in determining 
which it will rely upon in rendering a guilty verdict. When a special unanimity 
 
violating Article I, sections 17 and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution. State v. Ellison, 239 
S.W.3d 603, 606 (Mo. 2007) (en banc); see also State v. Davis, 226 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2007) (“As a general rule, evidence of uncharged misconduct is inadmissible for the 
purpose of showing the propensity to commit such crimes.”) (quoting State v. Barriner, 34 
S.W.3d 139, 144 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (holding evidence of prior misconduct may be admissible 
if it is logically relevant in establishing the defendant’s guilt)). 
 151. 21A AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 840 (2007). 
 152. See State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 158 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). It is no longer 
permissible for each individual juror to determine which incident he or she will rely upon in 
convicting the defendant. 
 153. One can easily imagine the inevitable jury deadlock that would ensue if multiple offenses 
were charged in multiple counts, and each count required that the jury be unanimous as to a 
particular act selected from multiple acts alleged. While there will certainly be situations where 
the prosecution charges and receives guilty verdicts on multiple counts, the added counts simply 
magnify the level of complexity faced by jurors in deliberating, more specifically when numerous 
offenses are alleged. Ultimately, the prosecution must balance its desire to seek guilty verdicts on 
multiple counts against the capacity of the jury to undertake deepening levels of analysis for 
multiple and distinct offenses. 
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instruction is issued to the jury in conjunction with the verdict directors, that 
instruction should read: 
The defendant is accused in Count _____ of having committed the crime of 
_____. The State alleges that the defendant committed the crime of _____ on 
multiple occasions. 
In order to find the defendant guilty of _____ in Count _____, one particular 
act of _____ must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and you must 
unanimously agree to the same particular act constituting the offense. 
You need not unanimously agree that the defendant committed all the acts of 
_____, and it is not necessary that the particular act agreed upon be stated in 
the verdict.154 
In cases where the prosecution believes there is “no reasonable likelihood of 
juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only question is whether or not 
the defendant in fact committed all of them,”155 prosecutors should consider 
submitting an additional, modified unanimity instruction to the jury. This 
instruction should read: 
The defendant is accused in Counts _____ through _____ of having committed 
the crime(s) of _____on multiple occasions. 
If you unanimously agree that all of the acts alleged to have been committed 
by the defendant in Counts _____ through _____ have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of _____ in Counts 
_____ through _____. 
If instead the prosecution chooses to elect a single act or occurrence to 
constitute the offense charged, the jury will focus their attention specifically on 
the act for which the prosecution is able to produce the strongest evidence. 
When the prosecution charges one count of a criminal offense and elects a 
single act to constitute that offense, the instruction submitted in conjunction 
with the verdict director should read: 
In alleging the defendant committed the crime of _____, the State relies upon 
evidence regarding a single act constituting the alleged crime. 
To convict the defendant of ____, you must unanimously agree that this 
specific act was proved.156 
 
 154. This suggested instruction is patterned after WPIC 4.25 (3d ed. 2008) and PIK-CR3d 
68.07 (2009). 
 155. See supra notes 127 and accompanying text. The South Dakota Supreme Court also 
stated this instruction should always be given where “the testimony of the victim recounts 
undifferentiated or generic occurrences of the sexual act,” because “neither an election nor a 
unanimity instruction is very helpful where the victim is unable to distinguish between a series of 
acts, any one of which could constitute the charged offense.” State v. Muhm, 775 N.W.2d 508, 
519 (S.D. 2009). 
 156. This suggested instruction is patterned after WPIC 4.26 (3d ed. 2006). 
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When an offense is charged in multiple counts, the instruction prefacing the 
verdict directors should read: 
In alleging the defendant committed the crime of _____ in Count _____, the 
State relies upon evidence regarding a single act constituting the alleged crime. 
To convict the defendant on Count _____, you must unanimously agree that 
this specific act was proved.157 
This instruction must be reproduced for each count. Such instructions 
specifying and explaining the state’s election of a particular occurrence cures 
the constitutional defect found by the court in Celis-Garcia, and the state may 
permissibly allege general time frames within the verdict directors for each 
count.158 As established in early Missouri jurisprudence, such general time 
frames are permissible because time is not of the essence in child sex crimes, 
and the defendant is not unconstitutionally subjected to double jeopardy.159 
Courts have long held time is not of the essence in child sex abuse cases,160 
finding a “variance between allegation and proof is not fatal unless the 
variance [is] material to the merits of the case and prejudicial to the defense of 
the defendant.”161 When the defendant is unable to raise or establish an alibi 
defense in trial, general allegations of time are properly upheld by the trial 
court.162 In these circumstances, the defendant is “adequately protected” by the 
requirement that the trier of fact, who “weigh[s] the witness’s inability to 
specify the exact day and time of the alleged crime,” as well as “the subsequent 
inability of the defendant to establish an alibi defense over so long a period of 
time,” must find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.163 Courts have held 
general time frames do not subject the defendant to double jeopardy because: 
 
 157. This suggested instruction is patterned after WPIC 4.26 (3d ed. 2006). 
 158. General timeframes may also be alleged in conjunction with a unanimity instruction for 
the same reasons. 
 159. See, e.g., State v. Sexton, 929 S.W.2d 909, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 160. See State v. Hoban, 738 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). The 
court stated the following: 
The state in the case at bar could not have been any more specific as to the date and time 
of occurrence. The child victim was unable to narrow the time span to a period shorter 
than while she was in the second and third grade. We find the more prudent rule of law to 
be reflected in those cases which expressly recognize that an alibi defense does not 
change the nature of the charges against the defendant or suddenly incorporate time as a 
necessary element of the offense. Any other rule would too often preclude prosecution of 
crimes involving child victims as here where the crimes are not discovered until some 
time after commission. 
Id. 
 161. State v. Douglas, 720 S.W.2d 390, 393–94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting State v. Jarrett, 
481 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Mo 1972)). 
 162. See id. 
 163. Hoban, 738 S.W.2d at 541–42. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
516 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:493 
“[w]hen time is not of the essence of an offense and the state is not confined in 
its proof to any specific date within the statute of limitations, a prosecution 
therefor[sic] will usually operate as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for this 
offense committed within the period of limitation at any time prior to the filing 
of the information or indictment.”164 
For the first time since Celis-Garcia, a Missouri appellate court validated this 
reasoning in State v. Miller.165 Interestingly, the defendant in Miller was 
charged with ten counts of sexual abuse over an eight-year period166 but 
convicted of only six counts.167 Citing to Celis-Garcia, the court observed it is 
“well settled law” that “time is not ‘of the essence’” in sex offenses, and “the 
inclusion of a more restrictive time range in an instruction constitutes mere 
surplusage.”168 The court further observed that “[u]nlike the time of the 
offense, which . . . is not an essential element thereof, the method of the 
charged offense, as prescribed by statute, is an essential element of the 
crime.”169 The jury’s decision to find the defendant not guilty of four counts 
charged in the ten-count indictment lends further support to the idea that jurors 
are capable of differentiating between the various offenses alleged in a multi-
count indictment, particularly when each offense is represented by one 
count.170 
CONCLUSION 
In recognizing the changes effected by Celis-Garcia, it is equally 
important to recognize what has not changed. In Missouri, a high emphasis 
will continue to be placed on protecting child victims.171 The prosecution’s 
ability to submit general verdict directors in a multiple acts case has been 
affected only in that additional steps must be taken by the prosecution prior to 
deliberation in order to protect the defendant’s right to a unanimous jury 
verdict. While Celis-Garcia undoubtedly makes it more difficult for 
prosecutors to obtain guilty verdicts in multiple acts cases by adding an 
additional unanimity requirement, it also affords defendants necessary and 
critical constitutional protection in multiple acts cases. 
In any multiple acts case, prosecutors will first need to determine the 
nature of the offenses charged in the indictment. For each offense capable of 
 
 164. Douglas, 720 S.W.2d at 395 (quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 280 (1978)). 
 165. State v. Miller, No. WD 71175, 2011 WL 2446408, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. June 21, 2011). 
 166. More specifically, the defendant was charged with one count for each offense. 
 167. Miller, 2011 WL 2446408 at *1. 
 168. Id. at *2. 
 169. Id. at *4. The court concluded that “[a]ccordingly, even if there is sufficient evidence to 
convict a defendant of the charged crime on an alternative basis for the offense permitted by 
statute, where that method was not submitted to the jury, the conviction cannot stand.” Id. 
 170. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra notes 42–44. 
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commission by alternative means, the prosecution must then determine which 
means of commission are relevant to the case.172 For each of these alternative 
means, at least one count should be charged within the general time frame 
established by the victim so as not to limit the admissibility of evidence at trial. 
The prosecutor should be as specific as possible in alleging this time frame so 
as to enable the defendant to adequately prepare his or her defense. As noted in 
Celis-Garcia, this will be particularly important when the defendant’s trial 
strategy is to rely upon the “evidentiary inconsistencies and factual 
improbabilities respecting each specific allegation.”173 At the close of the 
evidence, prosecutors must strategically determine whether to proceed on all 
counts or to amend the indictment so that each offense is represented by one 
count. Finally, after determining the number of counts upon which it will rely, 
the prosecution must decide whether to elect one underlying act to constitute 
the charged offense for each count or to submit a special unanimity instruction 
to the jury for deliberation.174 In cases where the defendant’s guilt is 
overwhelming and the entirety of the child’s testimony is likely to be received 
by the jury as credible—or alternatively where the child has difficulty 
articulating and distinguishing between the various offenses—the jury should 
arguably receive a special unanimity instruction. When the defendant is likely 
to rely on evidentiary inconsistencies and factual improbabilities, as is often 
the case in child sex crimes, a specific election by the prosecution will 
arguably be more beneficial. 
Celis-Garcia is a hallmark decision in Missouri constitutional law because 
of the protection it affords defendants in all multiple acts cases, irrespective of 
subject matter. By requiring the most stringent possible standard of specificity 
in verdict directors, a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict is properly 
safeguarded from duplicitous and multiplicitous indictments. When 
approached strategically by prosecutors, the either/or rule will not burden 
criminal convictions, but rather strengthen the overall criminal justice system. 
BLISS WORRELL* 
 
 172. See infra Addendum. 
 173. State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 159 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (“[T]he fact that Ms. 
Celis-Garcia relied on evidentiary inconsistencies and factual improbabilities respecting each 
specific allegation of hand-to-genital contact makes it more likely that individual jurors convicted 
her on the basis of different acts.” (emphasis added)). 
 174. Still, if the single count charged represents an offense capable of commission by 
alternative means, the prosecution must ensure such means are not submitted in the disjunctive 
within the verdict director. Arguably, this is a “forced” election in that the prosecution must 
specify to the jury upon which means it will rely for a conviction. 
* J.D. candidate, 2013. I would like to thank Professor Anders Walker for his direction and input 
in overseeing the development of this paper, and also Judge Michael Wolf for his invaluable input 
based on his experience on the bench. I would also like to thank the entire staff of the Saint Louis 
University Law Journal for their diligent work spent readying this paper for publication.  
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ADDENDUM: PROSECUTORIAL EITHER/OR CHECKLIST 
Table 1: Offenses Involving “Deviate Sexual Intercourse”175 
 
Offenses 
 
FORCIBLE & STATUTORY SODOMY 
§ 566.060 
§ 566.062 
§ 566.064 
 
DEVIATE SEXUAL ASSAULT 
§ 566.070 
 
 
Means of Commission 
 
CONTACT BETWEEN VICTIMS 
GENITALS AND. . . 
 Defendant’s Hand 
 Defendant’s Mouth 
 Defendant’s Tongue 
 Defendant’s Anus 
 
CONTACT BETWEEN DEFENDANTS 
GENITALS AND. . . 
 Victim’s Hand 
 Victim’s Mouth 
 Victim’s Tongue 
 Victim’s Anus 
 
PENETRATION OF VICTIM’S SEX 
ORGAN BY. . . 
 Defendant’s Finger 
 Instrument or Object 
 
PENETRATION OF VICTIM’S ANUS 
BY. . . 
 Defendant’s Finger 
 Instrument or Object  
 
 
  
 
 175. Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.010(1) (2006). As evidenced by Table 1, any offense involving 
“deviate sexual intercourse” could potentially be committed by any one of twelve alternative 
means for each count charged. If multi-count indictments submitted to juries failed to allege the 
specific act constituting the offense for each count charged, one can easily imagine scenarios in 
which jurors would be able to individually select from as many as 50+ alleged occurrences in 
unanimously finding the defendant guilty. 
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Table 2: Offenses Involving “Sexual Contact”176 
 
Offenses 
 
CHILD MOLESTATION 
§ 566.067 
§ 566.068 
 
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
§ 566.090 
§ 566.093 
§ 566.095 
 
SEXUAL ABUSE 
§ 566.100 
 
 
Means of Commission 
 
DEFENDANT TOUCHES VICTIM’S. . . 
 Genitals 
 Anus 
 Female Breasts 
 Any of Above through Clothing 
 
DEFENDANT TOUCHES VICTIM 
WITH HIS/HER GENITALS  
 
  
 
 176. Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.010(3) (2006). As evidenced by Table 2, any offense involving 
“sexual contact” could potentially be committed by any one of five alternative means for each 
count charged. 
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